(Updated) The Fourth International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec 2010) was held in Malacca, Malaysia on October 13-15, 2010. It was co-organized by Multimedia University, Malaysia and the Malaysian Society for Cryptology Research (MSCR). The proceedings is published as an LNCS volume entitled "Provable Security" from Springer (Online)

Provable security is an important research area in modern cryptography. Cryptographic primitives or protocols without a rigorous proof cannot be regarded as secure even in practice. In fact, there are many schemes that were originally thought as secure but eventually broken, which clearly indicates the need of formal security assurance. With provable security, we are confident in using cryptographic schemes and protocols in various real-world applications. Meanwhile, schemes with provable security sometimes give only theoretical feasibility rather than a practical construction, and correctness of the proofs may be difficult to verify. ProvSec conference thus provides a platform for researchers, scholars and practitioners to exchange new ideas for solving these problems in the provable security area.

The first ProvSec conference was successfully held on Nov. 1-2, 2007 at the University of Wollongong, Australia and the proceedings were published in LNCS Vol. 4784. The second ProvSec conference was held in Shanghai, China on Oct. 30-Nov. 1, 2008 and the proceedings were published in LNCS Vol. 5324. The third conference was held in Guangzhou, China on Nov. 11-13, 2009 and the proceedings were published in LNCS Vol. 5848.

Topics include all aspects of provable security for cryptographic primitives or protocols, and include but are not limited to the following areas: 

  • Cryptographic primitives
  • Security notions, approaches, and paradigms
  • Formal security model
  • Secure cryptographic protocols and applications
  • Provable secure block ciphers and hash functions
  • Digital signatures
  • Privacy and anonymity technologies
  • Steganography and steganalysis
  • Lattice-based security reductions
  • Pairing-based provably secure cryptography